Learning from Rohingya Refugee Repatriation to Myanmar by Saha, K. C.
Learning from Rohingya Refugee
Repatriation to Myanmar
K. C. Saha
Causes of the Refuge Displacement
The Arakan region of Myanmar, like the Kachin state,the Karen state, and the special division of theChins, has witnessed insurgency since Myanmar’s
independence in 1948. The Rohingyas are Muslim descend-
ants of Arab and Persian traders who settled in the Arakan
region, and there has been intermarriage with the indig-
enous population over several hundred years. The popula-
tion of the Muslims in this region is about 3 million. The
region has a common boundary with Bangladesh, sepa-
rated by the Naaf River and interspersed with forests and
hills. The Arakan province has been traditionally under the
influence of Bengali culture because of its proximity to
Bangladesh.
Even prior to 1992, there had been several displacements
of the Rohingyas, the major one being in 1978, when the
Myanmar government announced that there was an alarm-
ing increase in the number of illegal migrants from Bang-
ladesh, in the Arakan region. A campaign disguised as a
search for illegal immigrants produced a wave of refugees
to Bangladesh. “At least 130,000 Rohingyas had deserted
their homes and went over to Bangladesh.”1 The Myanmar
authorities maintained that those who had fled across the
border were Bangladesh nationals who had illegally entered
Myanmar. However, under international pressure, the gov-
ernment agreed to accept the refugees from Bangladesh.
An agreement for repatriation was signed with Bangladesh,
and the Rohingya refugees were repatriated to Myanmar.
In Myanmar, during general elections in 1990, the
Rohingyas supported the National League for Democracy
(nld), whose focus was termination of military rule in
Myanmar. The military regime, under the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (slorc), negated the results of
the general election and intensified its campaign against
the ethnic minorities who supported the nld. The
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Myanmar authorities alleged that the Rohingyas in gen-
eral were aiding, abetting, and hiding the insurgents who
were supporting an independent state of Arakan. “The au-
thorities issued arrest warrants against 10,000 Muslim stu-
dents for an alleged insurgency plot against the State.”2
Subsequently the army terrorized the entire Rohingya
population, who started deserting their homes. The un high
commissioner for refugees, Sadako Ogata, in a statement
issued on February 14, 1992, said that “she was deeply con-
cerned about the conditions in Myanmar that were forc-
ing people to flee at the rate of 400 to 600 a day.”3 The
unhcr Technical Mission, which inspected a large number
of encampments in Bangladesh, reported that “the refu-
gees were streaming into the country at a rate of thousand
a day. Unless the conditions improved in Myanmar, their
numbers were expected to increase.”4
“About 210,000 Rohingya refugees reached Bangladesh
by 1992.”5 Amnesty International reported that the mili-
tary regime had seriously violated the human rights of eth-
nic minorities in Myanmar. An Amnesty fact-finding team
sent to interview Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh con-
firmed reports of widespread human rights abuses, includ-
ing torture and murder. “The U.S. Committee for Refugees
which visited Bangladesh in February, 1992, also reported
that the refugees had fled because of human rights abuses
committed against them by the Myanmar authorities. Their
homes and mosques were destroyed, their lands appropri-
ated, their men were subjected to forced labour and physi-
cal abuse. The Myanmar Military’s actions were part of a
deliberate campaign of terror aimed at driving the
Rohingyas out of Myanmar.”6 In the February 1993 Report
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the
un special rapporteur on Myanmar concluded that Mus-
lims in the state were at high risk.
Steps Taken for Repatriation of the Refugees
The influx of such a large number of refugees posed seri-
ous problems for Bangladesh. It expressed its serious con-
cern to the Myanmar regime. Prime Minister Begum
Khaleda Zia pleaded that “the Myanmar authorities must
take back the Muslim refugees who fled to Bangladesh to
escape military crackdown. Bangladesh cannot look after
the refugees for long. They are citizens of Myanmar and
they will have to return to their country.”7
The mediation of un Undersecretary General Jan
Eliasson to resolve the refugee problem between Bangla-
desh and Myanmar produced results. Myanmar agreed to
send its foreign minister, U Ohn Gyaw, to Dacca for talks
with his counterpart on the modalities for the return of
over 210,000 Rohingya Muslims. Myanmar authorities
made the assurance that that it was prepared to accept refu-
gees who had evidence of prior residence in Myanmar. An
agreement calling for “safe and voluntary” repatriation of
refugees was signed in early 1992 by the foreign ministers
of both countries. An agreement on technical modalities
to be followed in bringing repatriation, signed by officials
of both countries, provided methods for checking the iden-
tity of the refugees. Under the agreement, repatriation was
to start on May 15, 1992. But repatriation could not start on
the decided date because a majority of the refugees were
against any return. However, talks at the official level be-
tween the two countries continued. A proposal to involve
the unhcr during repatriation was rejected during the talks
held on July 30, 1992. However, later the two countries
agreed to involve the unhcr in the repatriation of refu-
gees. Both countries further agreed on a four-point for-
mula to create congenial conditions in Arakan for the
repatriation of refugees. The agreement reached on August
23, 1992, provided:
1. Azan (call for prayer) over loudspeakers will be allowed
in mosques in the Muslim majority Myanmar province.
2. The Rohingyas will be allowed to move freely from vil-
lage to village in their homeland, ending earlier restric-
tions.
3. The Rohingyas from their shelters in Bangladesh can
travel to Arakan to see for themselves the conditions cre-
ated for them and then come back to camps.
4. Those Rohingyas who do not possess a citizenship cer-
tificate can apply for it after returning home.8
Repatriation began in batches, in early September 1992.
But soon there were protests from a large number of refu-
gees opposed to repatriation. “The refugee camp at
Dhuapalong built with un assistance was the scene of
bloody clashes between refugees and the Bangladesh secu-
rity forces which left 6 Myanmar Muslim refugees dead,
scores injured and over 200 arrested.”9 The protests of refu-
gees continued in other camps also. “The inmates of
Naikhangchari camps at Gundum went on a rampage, dam-
aging the camp office. The refugees demonstrated inside
the camps opposing repatriation.”10 Chaos and confusion
prevailed in the camps. “The armed refugee militants who
were opposing the process of repatriation virtually seized
control of camps at Dhechuapalong after the rumour was
spread that a fresh group of refugees would be sent to
Arakan. Tension was also mounting in camps at Nayapara,
Balukhali, Dhum, Sailor Dheba, Dhuapalong and
Rangikhali areas near Cox’s Bazar in the Chittagong Hill
Tract. Large contingents of Bangladesh police raided sev-
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eral camps on October 10, 11, and 12, 1992, to apprehend
the rebels and made number of arrests.”11 The situation be-
came quite tense in a number of camps. “At least 70 people
including 15 policemen were injured in a fierce gun battle
between security forces and militant Muslim refugees on
December 5, 1992. The clash took place when a group of 1300
refugees willing to return to Arakan, were being taken to a
transit camp in Cox’s Bazar for repatriation. Some of the
refugees fired from automatic weapons. The security forces
hit back by firing 40 rounds. Tension continued to prevail
at the Nayapara refugee camp, after the violent incident.”12
The Bangladesh government had banned any political
activity by the refugees, but their leaders secretly contin-
ued their activities. Two organizations of the Rohingya
Muslims—Rohingya Solidarity Organization (rso) and the
Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (arif)—were active. Their
aim was to set up Rohingya settlements in different parts
in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh and to launch a movement to
establish a Muslim Rohingya state, with the help of inter-
national assistance. These organizations had a considerable
influence over the refugees in the camps.
The un high commissioner for refugees, Ms Ogata, ap-
pealed to the prime minister of Bangladesh to stop the
forced return and to allow the unhcr free access to the
refugee camps. The unhcr had pulled out of the repatria-
tion towards the end of November 1992, after allegations
that many refugees were sent home against their will. Bang-
ladesh, on the other hand, accused the unhcr and some
Western relief agencies of discouraging refugees from go-
ing back to their homes. A new memorandum of under-
standing was signed between Bangladesh and the unhcr,
which provided that refugees willing to return home would
themselves register their names for repatriation, before
being taken to one of the three transit camps on the bank
of the Naaf River. The new agreement gave unhcr officials
unlimited free access to the refugee camps. Under the pre-
vious system, camp officials had drawn up a list of volun-
teers from names provided by refugee headmen. But aid
agency workers often claimed that the headmen were bribed
or forced to provide names.
The refugee repatriation became further complicated
when a number of refugees deserted the camps. It was al-
leged that local communal organizations instigated the
refugees to desert the camps, and as a result 20,000 refu-
gees ran away from camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban
to hilly areas. Several hundred local residents of
Maheshkhali area demonstrated before the police station
on August 3, 1993. The demonstrators alleged that “about
400 Rohingya refugees had so far entered the Maheshkhali
area after fleeing their camps. They urged the authorities con-
cerned to take back the refugees to their assigned shelters.”13
Repatriation involved several rounds of talks between
officials of the two countries. The fifteenth round was held
on August 31, 1993. Repatriation, which began in Septem-
ber 1992, continued in batches throughout 1993. During a
cyclone on May 5, 1994, in which twelve out of nineteen
camps were razed to the ground, eighty-six refugees were
killed. The government suspended repatriation in view of
the losses suffered by the refugees in the cyclone. Between
August 1994 and March 1995, large-scale repatriation was
completed. “But the repatriation came to a virtual halt in
April 1995 when Myanmar authorities suddenly started talk-
ing about re-verification of individual refugees who had
earlier been cleared for repatriation. Thus repatriation of
54,000 remaining refugees became uncertain.”14
In the beginning of the repatriation process, the
Myanmar authorities offered clearance to refugees on the
basis of a “runaway list,” which they themselves had pre-
pared. But they later admitted that the runaway list was far
from accurate. “About 42,000 cases were pending as they
did not pass the scrutiny carried out by the Myanmar au-
thorities. If one member of the family failed the scrutiny,
the whole family was stranded. The files of the failed indi-
viduals were sent to the Bangladesh authorities for more
particulars. And such a process of re-verification sometimes
took as long as one year.”15
Repatriation continued in small batches in 1996 and 1997.
During repatriation there were fresh cases of Rohingya
Muslims from Myanmar coming to Bangladesh. “Bangla-
desh Rifles 39 Battalion had pushed back a group of 81
Rohingyas to Myanmar on April 25, 1996. The Bangladesh
Rifles personnel had apprehended them while they were
trying to enter into Bangladesh crossing the Teknaf bor-
der. They formally handed over the apprehended Rohingyas
to the Myanmar Border Security Force (nasaca).”16 In Feb-
ruary 1997, a total of 26,832 refugees were still awaiting re-
patriation. The director of the unhcr’s Regional Bureau
for Asia said, “We are close to winding up the repatriation
of the refugees from Bangladesh. We will now only focus
on re-integration of the returnees in their homes. The situ-
ations in Myanmar have changed a lot. And the authorities
there were extending all co-operation to the unhcr. They
have accepted the protection role of unhcr and granted
its international staff unrestricted access to all the returnees.
But there is no guarantee that no fresh exodus will happen
in future.”17
In the meantime, the Myanmar authorities had set Au-
gust 15, 1997, as the deadline for repatriation of all refugees.
But repatriation continued to be faced with problems. “The
government postponed scheduled repatriation of 200 refu-
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gees on July 23, 1997, following a law and order situation in
two camps. Some 200 refugees from the Katupalong camp
were due to go back home. A militant group from the
Nayapara camp marched towards the Katupalong camp and
asked the refugees not to return to Myanmar. Hundreds of
refugees armed with bamboo sticks, bows and arrows forced
out six officials and employees from the camp. They also
damaged six huts and looted the goods that were to be dis-
tributed amongst refugees. Police arrested four refugees on
charge of rioting.”18 The rioting was very serious. “unhcr
officials from Dacca went to Cox’s Bazar on July 24, 1997,
morning to visit the camps and had talks with government
officials on the latest developments. Unhcr officials how-
ever said that no force was being applied to make the refu-
gees agree to be repatriated.”19
An editorial in a Bangladesh newspaper commented
“that the Bangladesh preparation fell short of taking the
unhcr officials along, which was why they were purport-
edly urging the Bangladesh authorities now to ensure vol-
untary repatriation. Bangladesh might have followed the
procedure of sending the local unhcr office the list of
would-be returnees. Seemingly there had been some com-
munication gap. But it was ironical that Bangladesh had to
undergo a sensitivity test at the fag end of the send off proc-
ess involving the last batch of 21,000 refugees”20
A week after the riot, further talks were held. “A tripar-
tite meeting among government officials, unhcr repre-
sentatives and leaders of Rohingya refugees was held in
Cox’s Bazar on July 30, 1997 which failed to resolve the prob-
lem that arose out of anti-repatriation stand taken by a sec-
tion of the refugees. The meeting held for the consecutive
day ended inconclusively, as leaders of Rohingya refugees
were firm on their eight-point demand, which included
suspension of repatriation till democracy was restored in
Myanmar. Despite repeated assurances by both the gov-
ernment and unhcr that their demands would be consid-
ered, the militant refugee leaders did not agree to give up
their anti-repatriation agitation.”21
There were suggestions from some quarters and inter-
national organizations that the remaining refugees who
were unwilling to repatriate should be allowed to settle in
Bangladesh. Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad
Azad said “that Bangladesh would not allow the remaining
refugees to settle in the country permanently. It should be
the responsibility of the international community to settle
them elsewhere. Bangladesh with its limited resources
should not bear the additional burden of allowing the refu-
gees to stay in Bangladesh permanently.”22 The remaining
refugees maintained that the situation in Myanmar was far
from normal. “Some refugees in Kutapalong camp claimed
that 15,000 refugees who had been earlier repatriated to
Myanmar came back to Bangladesh during the last couple
of months to escape the wrath of the military junta.”23 “The
anti-repatriation group thought that if they could hold off
the return of refugees until August 15, 1997, the deadline set
by the Myanmar authorities to receive the Rohingya
returnees, they would be able to stay back in Bangladesh
for good.”24 Officials of the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry
observed that it would be difficult to complete repatria-
tion by the August 15, 1997, deadline, because the process
of convincing and counselling was still on.
The Bangladesh authorities conveyed their feeling of
urgency to Myanmar authorities and requested an oppor-
tunity to sit across the table and discuss the issue. It was
also made clear that lists of many refugees who had volun-
teered their names had been sent to Myanmar authorities
for clearance, but no clearance could be obtained. Tension
continued in the refugee camps. “Over a hundred persons,
including 8 policemen, were injured in a clash between
policemen and the refugees at Nayapara refugee camp in
Cox’s Bazar on October 21, 1997. Police said the trouble began
when a group of refugees attacked the policemen as they tried
to stop a clash between two rival groups of refugees.”25
The refugee repatriation in 1998 and 1999 was negligi-
ble. There are still 20,000 to 22,000 refugees in Bangladesh.
Negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar continue.
It was agreed that after January 2000, fifty refugees would
be repatriated every week under unhcr supervision. But
it is still to be seen when repatriation of all the refugees is
actually completed.
Lessons from the Rohingya Refugee Repatriation
Addressing causes of displacement
Before undertaking any repatriation of refugees, it is nec-
essary to address the causes of displacement. Rohingya dis-
placement was the result of persecution by the Myanmar
regime. The first step in such a situation was to persuade
Myanmar to stop such acts of persecution and to take back
its own citizens who were staying in Bangladesh as refu-
gees. After the effective and timely intervention by the un
and the international community, the Myanmar authori-
ties adopted a positive attitude to resolving the crisis. They
admitted that the Rohingyas in the Arakan region had been
subjected to many restrictions and that their freedom of
movement and freedom of religion had been curtailed.
They also agreed to improve the conditions in Arakan and
signed an agreement with Bangladesh to that effect. Fur-
ther, they agreed to negotiate with Bangladesh on the
modalities to be followed for the repatriation of the refugees.
To bring about repatriation of refugees in any refugee
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situation, the un and the international community should
attempt to bring about reconciliation between the state and
the refugees purely out of humanitarian consideration,
without concern for any political issues. Such reconcilia-
tion must ensure the safety and security of the refugees
and the enjoyment of their rights and privileges, just as
any other citizens. In the case of the Rohingyas, if the un
and the international community had insisted that democ-
racy first be restored in Myanmar, as many refugees had
demanded, before repatriation was begun, it is unlikely that
any repatriation could have occurred.
Bilateral agreements as a basis of repatriation
Neither Bangladesh nor Myanmar signed the 1951 Conven-
tion on the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol. How-
ever, both countries entered into a bilateral agreement. The
Myanmar authorities adopted a flexible approach by ac-
cepting refugees with proof of prior residence in Myanmar.
Implementation was made more flexible as a result of a
series of meetings held at the official level to sort out prac-
tical difficulties experienced during actual repatriation.
Bilateral agreements are generally criticized on the grounds
that such agreements may overlook the interest of the refu-
gees, and that repatriation may be effected even when the
situation is not conducive from the point of view of the
refugees. But many countries prefer a bilateral framework
for finding a solution, since they feel that involvement of a
third party can unnecessarily internationalize the issue. The
Rohingya refugee repatriation has shown that bilateral ne-
gotiations can bring about solutions to the satisfaction of
all. Moreover, even within a bilateral framework, the inter-
national community can always intervene if the human
rights of refugees are violated. What is of utmost impor-
tance from the point of view of the refugees is that a solu-
tion to the crisis be found, by effecting early repatriation,
and if a bilateral mechanism can help bring it about it, that
should be pursued. So there is a need to strengthen the
bilateral mechanism rather than to view it with skepticism.
Involvement of the unhcr
In case of repatriation within the framework of a bilateral
agreement, the scope of involvement of the unhcr is lim-
ited. The parties to the agreement should enjoy full free-
dom and support from the unhcr. The role of the unhcr
should be only to oversee the repatriation, and if violation
of the rights of refugees occurs, it should highlight such a
violation and take up the issue with the authorities con-
cerned. Refugees in most situations demand repatriation
only under supervision of the unhcr, but involvement of
the unhcr entails unhcr clearance at every stage of repa-
triation. Such involvement can be counter-productive in
many situations, so it is necessary to clearly spell out the
scope of involvement of the unhcr in each refugee repa-
triation process. The role of the unhcr in repatriation
under a multilateral agreement when the states have signed
the 1951 Convention, and the role under a bilateral agree-
ment, cannot be the same. Presently, the unhcr follows
the same approach in every repatriation.
Voluntary Repatriation
There were allegations that Bangladesh had repatriated
many Rohingya refugees against their wishes, from the very
beginning. The unhcr, which was involved in the repa-
triation, despite initial reluctance of both countries, also
protested against forced repatriation and withdrew itself
from the repatriation process. The principle of non-
refoulement has to be strictly followed in any repatriation,
but vested groups often manage to stall repatriation, tak-
ing umbrage at this principle. These groups sometimes
manage to obtain the support of the unhcr and succeed
in their objective of stalling repatriation.
Bangladesh has accused the unhcr and other ngos of
obstructing the repatriation and supporting groups totally
opposed to repatriation under any circumstances. There
were instances of armed refugee groups preventing willing
refugees from repatriating. The refugee groups continued
to oppose repatriation on the grounds that the situation in
Myanmar had not yet returned to normal and that those
who had been repatriated were being persecuted by the
Myanmar regime. They also claimed that some refugees
who had repatriated came back to Bangladesh. The unhcr
should have investigated such instances to effectively coun-
ter such allegations or to take up the issue with the appro-
priate authorities in order for them to take corrective action.
The question to be answered is, How can misuse of the
issue of principle of non-refoulement be prevented, so that
vested groups cannot stall repatriations?
Law and order in camps
There had been serious breaches of law and order in refu-
gee camps on several occasions when refugee groups
clashed against the security forces and among themselves.
Such clashes were violent, and firearms were used, with loss
of human life. Security forces had to open fire on several
occasions to regain control. Proliferation of sophisticated
firearms in refugee camps is a challenge of growing con-
cern. Some refugee groups with arms were able to terror-
ize other refugees in the camps. Such acts of violence not
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only embarrass the host country but also harden its posi-
tion. The host country tries to expedite repatriation and
takes measures to deny asylum to refugee groups in the
future, thereby undermining the entire principle of pro-
tection. Bangladesh had already prevented the entry of
some Rohingyas by arresting them at the border and hand-
ing them over to the Border Police of Myanmar.
The question is whether there is a need to evolve a code
for refugees, specifying their duties and obligations in the
host country. The 1951 convention has specified the rights
of refugees in the host country but is silent on this aspect.
Period of Repatriation
In the case of Rohingya refugees, repatriation started in
1992, but repatriation of all refugees has not been com-
pleted. In the initial years, repatriation of large numbers of
refugees could be completed, but in the later years repa-
triation was very slow, and during some periods there was
no repatriation at all. Any repatriation process is fraught
with uncertainty, but still there is need to have a timeframe
for repatriation. Refugee groups opposed to repatriation
were allowing only small groups to return, as a part of a
well-considered strategy to stall repatriation, and they suc-
ceeded in stretching out repatriation over eight years. The
long period of repatriation creates avoidable complications.
The Myanmar authorities applied stricter verification cri-
teria for the later refugees. They also set a deadline for com-
pletion of repatriation because they did not want the
process to continue indefinitely.
Repatriation or resettlement of remaining refugees
Out of 210,000 refugees, more than 190,000 refugees were
repatriated. What was the justification for the remaining
refugees to continue living in the camps? Those who have
genuine fears of persecution duly established after thor-
ough verification, case by case, may be allowed a longer
period of asylum in the host country, or be resettled there
or in a third country.
But the question is why other than these categories of
refugees, remaining refugees should be allowed to stay on.
Should the cessation of refugee status not be assumed as
their non-return is deliberate, particularly when meaning-
ful national protection is available?
Conclusion
Repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh could
be regarded as successful. The military regime in Myanmar
adopted a positive approach on the issue of repatriation of
the Rohingya refugees. This repatriation process has, how-
ever, highlighted many important issues that need to be
considered in order to promote more meaningful and ef-
fective refugee protection. In Myanmar, as a result of wide-
spread human rights abuses, hundreds of thousands of
people have fled the country and are living as refugees in
camps or settlements in Thailand. The same approach of
reconciliation and effective intervention by the interna-
tional community, as was seen in the case of Rohingya refu-
gees, can bring about voluntary repatriation to Myanmar
of other refugee groups.
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